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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MAURIA T. TANNER (SWENSEN),

)I

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellant, ]
v.
JAMES G. SWENSEN, JR.,

]
i
]
I

Civil Case No. 924901803DA
Appellate Case No. 940079-CA

Defendant and Appellee.

RULE 9 (C)(2)A: JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
This appeal is authorized under Utah Code Annotated, sec* 782-2 (3)(j), and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 which indicates
a procedure for taking appeals from judgments and order of trial
courts. This brief follows the structural requirements outlined in
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. This is an appeal
by Mauria T. Tanner (Swensen), Plaintiff, from a judgment and
Decree of Divorce.
RULE 9(C)(3): NATURE OF PRECEDENCE
This appeal is from a trial of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the
Honorable Dennis Frederick, without a jury. The final orders we.^
Amended Decree Of Divorce and Amended Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions of Law.
Brief Of Appellant
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the division of the marital property was

equitable.
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding

alimony of $700 per month for a two-year period.
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imputing

income from Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art
classes in the past during the summer, for purposes of child
support and alimony.
4.

Whether the trial court abused itfs discretion in using

Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner, Inc., in figuring child support
and/or alimony.
5.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding

that Ms. Tanner has the future capacity to earn $20,000 a year in
approximately two years.
6.

Whether the court abused its discretion in not awarding

attorney's fees.
7.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in not

allowing Plaintifffs counsel to present a

closing argument.

RULE 9(C)4: STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts which are material to the questions presented on
this appeal are as follows:
Brief Of Appellant
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA
Page 2

1.

The parties had a long-term marriage, approximately 19

years. They were married on the 22nd day of November, 1974, in Salt
Lake City, Utah. (Record at 23, line 15)
2.

The parties have four children. (Record at 21, line 13)

3.

Mauria Tanner worked to help James Swensen, Jr. obtain

two separate graduate degrees. (Record at 23, lines 18-25, Record
at 24, line 1-6)
4.

James Swensen, Jr., is currently a tax attorney as well

as a Certified Public Accountant with a Masters Degree in
Accountancy. (Record at 23 & 24)
5.

Ms. Tanner has recently begun a graduate program which

should be completed within two years with a Masters Degree in
Expressive Therapy from the University of Utah. (Record 23, lines
1-10)
6.

Ms. Tanner testified that in two years, she is hopeful

that she might earn up to $20,000 a year. (Record at 94, lines 2-4)
7.

Mr. Swensen's projected annual income for the year of

1993 was $67,500 (Defendant's Exhibit 2, page 0000043)
8.

Ms. Tanner has, in the past, earned approximately $1,500

a year for teaching Art in the summer time; however, she is not
planning to continue this seasonal job as a result of her year
Brief Of Appellant
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA
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round school obligation, (Transcript of Judge's Ruling, page 3,
line 19)
9.

Ms. Tanner owes her Father $3,000, of which $2,000 went

to Attorney's fees. (Record 35, lines 13-18)
10.

Ms. Tanner paid just under $5,000 for Attorney's fees

just prior to the loan from her Father. (Record at 35, lines 16-18)
11.

Ms. Tanner owed approximately $12,000 to law offices of

present counsel. (Record 36, lines 17-20)
12.

Ms. Tanner's lifestyle significantly altered since the

separation. (Record at 39, lines 5-20)
13.

The Tanner Corporation made disbursements for the purpose

of paying the personal taxes of the parties. (Record at 48, lines
3-3)
14.

Ms. Tanner had no control over any of the IRA's ,

retirement accounts, savings accounts, or other significant marital
assets during separation - making no withdrawals from any of these
accounts. (Record at 51, lines 23-25, Record at 52, lines 5-6)
15.

Ms. Tanner never gave her permission to use or withdraw

marital funds. (Record at 55, lines 1-2)
16.

Mr. Swensen withdrew significant amounts from the marital

IRA accounts during the separation. (Record at 53, lines 14-19)
17.

Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen gave himself zero value

Brief Of Appellant
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for furniture, he has in his possession, although he admits taking
marital property. (Record at 152, lines 1-25, record at 153, lines
1-4, record 155, lines 1-25, and record at 156, lines 1-25)
18.

Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen paid his personal legal

fees from marital funds during the separation. (Record at 164,
lines 11-15)
19.

Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen used marital funds to

pay off his student loans in the approximate amount of $10,996.
(Record at 168, lines 2-25)
20.

Plaintifffs expert witness, a CPA, never received

requested materials and relied upon Swensenfs figure for
values regarding Defendant's business. (Record at 7, lines 7-20,
record at 16, lines 10-18, and record at 19, lines 20-25)
21.

Ms. Tanner has received some monies on a periodic basis

from Tanner, Inc., a family corporation. These disbursements have
occurred approximately five times in 19 years. The amounts have
varied. Ms. Tanner has generally received approximately $2,000 in
one year until several years ago when she received $8,000 two
years in succession. (Record at 50, lines 24-25, record at 51)
22.

Ms. Tanner received these two $8,000 amounts as a result

of the sale of a trading post business. (Record at 48, lines 18-23,
record at 50, lines 12-23)
Brief Of Appellant
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23.

The two previous disbursements from Tanner Inc. were

$2,000 and $4,000 respectively. (Record at 49, lines 1-5)
24.

These disbursements were generally intended to cover Ms.

Tannerfs allotted portion of the taxes for the family business.
(Record at 50)
25.

Ms. Tanner has been advised that she will not be

receiving any more lump sum payments as large as the amount of
$8,000 in the future by her father, Mr. Maurice Tanner, the
President of Tanner, Inc. Those larger $8,000 amounts accrued
solely as a result of the sale of the trading post business.
(Record at 50, lines 12-33)
26.

At trial, Plaintifffs counsel was not given the

opportunity to present a closing argument to make the court aware
of case law which pertained to the issues of fact and law before
the court, (Record at 192, lines 20-24)
27.

The trial court imputed income from sources no longer

available to Ms. Tanner.(Record at 50, lines 12-33)
28.

Ms. Tanner is planning to pursue a Ph.D. degree if

possible. Such training will require approximately 7 years (2 years
for the Masters1 degree and an additional 5 years for the Ph.D.)
(Record at 99, lines 20-25, record at 100, line 1)
29.

Ms. Tanner was awarded alimony for 2 years (Transcript of

Brief Of Appellant
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Judgefs Ruling, pages 1 & 2)

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
The Standard of Review on Appeal is that the Appellate Court
must reverse if there is a misapplication or misunderstanding of
the law, if the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings
or conclusions or if there is a serious inequity that must be
rectified as set forth in English v. English, 565 Pc2d 409, 410
(Utah 1977).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

The division of the marital property was not equitable.

Newmeyer v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1987), stated that
"in determining whether a certain division of property is equitable
... the relative abilities of the spouses to support themselves
after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable...division of the
fixed assets of the marriage".
Ms. Tanner contends that in the division of the property, the
trial court did not take into consideration her special
circumstances, i.e., her relative lack of work experience, and her
full-time student status.
2.

The court accepted values of property not consistent with

the worth of the property if sold, causing an inequitable division
of property.
Brief Of Appellant
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Page 7

3.

The court's award of $700 per month alimony for a two-

year period is an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d
250, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (1994).
4.

The court abused its discretion in imputing income from

Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art classes in the
summer as Ms. Tanner can no longer participate in that activity
because of her participation in year-round schooling. Savage v.
Savage. 658 P.2d 1201, (S. Ct. 1983). Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d
408, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 78. Ms. Tanner provided an accurate figure
regarding income for the purposes of child support.
5.

Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner, Inc. qualifies as a pre-

inheritance gift and the court abused it's discretion in utilizing
the family corporation in figuring child support and/or alimony,
as it was not income but a property interest.
A.

Ms. Tanner testified at trial that her brothers and
sisters also received similar disbursements to hers.

B.

That the Tanner family corporation has been in place for
approximately 35 years and it was in the form of preinheritance. (Record at 46, lines 16-21, record at 47,
line 11, and record at 47, lines 24-25). Typically,
inherited property will be awarded to the person who
inherited it, even when the property was inherited years
before the divorce.

C.

Newmeyer v, Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Ut. 1987). If the
court should determine that Tanner, Inc., was not preinheritance, it would be forced to admit that the
Plaintiff's/Appellant's
interest
in
the
family
corporation property was premarital property, at the very

Brief Of Appellant
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least, an interest which had not been commingled into the
marital estate, and one that was not augmented and/or
maintained by the other spouse in any capacity. A court
must find unique circumstances that warrant disregarding
the general rule that premarital property is separate
property. Waiters v. Waiters. 812 P.2d 64 (Ut. App.
1989).
6.

The trial court abused its discretion in finding that Msc

Tanner could earn $20,000 a year in two years, after she completed
her schooling. It presumed that she will indeed complete the
schooling, secure employment and earn that amount. Wiley v. Wiley.
227 Ut. Adv. Rep. 39 (1993), found such a finding improper.
7.

The court abused its discretion in not awarding

attorneyfs fees. Utah law provides that the award be based upon the
need of the party seeking the award, and reasonableness of the fee
sought. Hue* v. Hue*, 734 P.2d 417 (Ut. 1986). Sinclair v.
Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396 (Ut. 1986). Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117
(Ut. 1986). Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Ut. App.
1988).
8.

The court abused its discretion in not allowing

Plaintiff's counsel to present argument and cases relevant to the
matter at bar in closing argument. Bunnell v. The Industrial
Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 62 Utah Adv. Repc 9 (1987).

Brief Of Appellant
Appellate Case* No. 940079-CA
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action involving the issues of alimony,
property division, award of attorney fees and the related issues of
pre-inheritance property assessed as income as well as the
appropriateness of imputing income to Plaintiff/Appellant.
These matters were heard at trial before the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on the 16th day of December, 1993.
The final order and Judgement in this matter was executed on
the 22nd day of February, 1994.
Notice of Appeal was filed on the 4th day of February, 1994,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2 (3) (j) and Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.
Ms. Tanner received alimony for a two year period in the
amount of $700.00, even though she had a long-term marriage of 20
years, had been married to a tax attorney and CPA, for whom she had
worked in order that he receive his professional degrees and
credentials.
The trial courts' holdings in regards to property division,
alimony, attorneys fees, imputation of income from a family
corporation, etc., caused the Plaintiff/Appellant to bring this
appeal.
Brief Of Appellant
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The assets of the marriage were not divided equitably. The
Appellee during the term of marriage controlled all marital assetsc
Appellant had no aecess to marital funds during the pendancy, while
Appellee used marital funds for his personal benefit such as his
own attorney fees.
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, (Utah 1987) states that
division of property must also take into consideration the earning
capabilities of the parties, the ability of the parties to support
themselves after the divorce as well as the amount of alimony
awarded. The court did not properly consider the appellant's
ability to earn a living regarding the property division,
especially in light of the fact that the court awarded only $700„ 00
a month alimony for a two year period, even though the
Defendant/Appellee was a professional (tax attorney) and the
marriage was of a long duration.
In addition, the alimony award was inequitable. The court did
not take into consideration the factors in Jones v. Jones, 700 Po/
1072 (Utah S.C. 1985).
The court improperly imputed income from

pre-inheritance

disbursements from Appellant's family in determining alimony ev@^
though the evidence indicated Appellant would not receive futi
Brief Of Appellant
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disbursements of said funds. The court also imputed income from
Appellant's past participation in summer art classes, even though
Appellant testified that as a result of her student status, she
would no longer have an opportunity to teach those classes.
The trial court refused to award Plaintiff/Appellant her
attorney fees even though the evidence indicated Defendant/Appellee
used marital funds to pay his own attorney fees, and the evidence
also indicated that Appellant was a full-time student without any
income. In addition, Appellant testified she had borrowed monies to
pay for fees and costs of the divorce action. The courtfs findings
over-all demonstrated a general attitude of bias against
Plaintiff/Appellant which prejudiced the Appellant's right to a
fair and impartial trial.
POINT l:
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
The division of the marital property was not equitable.
Newmever v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279(Utah 1987), states thats
(in) determining whether a certain division of property
is equitable, neither the trial court nor this Court
considers the property division in a vacuum. The amount
of alimony awarded and the relative earning capabilities
of the parties are also relevant, because the relative
abilities of the spouses to support themselves after the
divorce are pertinent to an equitable determination of
Brief Of Appellant
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the division of the fixed assets of the marriage.
The trial court did not take the special circumstances of Ms.
Tanner into consideration when making the property division. During
the course of the marriage, the couple had four children, and Ms.
Tanner worked in minor clerical jobs. After the family began to
grow, Ms. Tanner worked only intermittently, usually teaching Art
classes in the summer to neighborhood children. Her primary
occupation, during the marriage, was raising children, caring for
the needs of her husband, and running the couple's home. Ms. Tanner
has no professional training and few marketable skills. Ms. Turner
has no dependable outside income. As a result of the success of the
law practice of Mr. Swensen, the couple enjoyed a very comfortable
lifestyle. Ms. Tanner was awarded no income producing assets.
(Transcript of Judge's Ruling, page 3, lines 2-5)
Ms. Tanner was at a tremendous disadvantage regarding the
marital property. She had no control over marital funds, during
the marriage and/or the separation, nor investments, bank accounts
and/or Real Property. Mr. Swensen controlled all of the assets making deposits, withdrawals, investments at will, without
permission from Ms. Tanner, and often without even informing her of
any of these transactions. (Record at 51, lines 23-25; 52, lines 5-=
6; 55, lines 1-2; 53, lines 14-19; 48, lines 3-4; 164, 11-15; 168,
Brief Of Appellant
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lines 2-25; 52, lines 1-25; and at 58, lines 23-20.
Ms. Tanner received some monies from Tanner, Inc., during the
years of the marriage, but this money was intended to cover Ms.
Tannerfs allotted portion of taxes for the family business and was
not intended to supplement her income. She has been informed by her
father, Mr. Maurice Tanner, that she will not be receiving any more
large disbursements of money from Tanner, Inc., similar to those
she had in the recent past because those monies had come from the
sale of a family business. Ms. Tanner has no current income that
she can depend upon for support.
Mr. Swensen on the other hand, has a law degree and a degree
in accounting. He is a successful tax attorney and a Certified
Public Accountant. Mr. Swensen1s projected annual income for the
year of 1993 was $67,000. (Defendants exhibit 2, page 0000043)
The division of property as done by the trial court creates an
inequity by dividing the property in such a way that Ms. Tanner
does not have any income from the properties she received to
support herself, yet Mr. Swensen has the benefit of the property he
received and the degrees he holds to support himself.
In addition, the court accepted the values proffered on the
exhibits as valid even though Defendant claimed a zero value.
(Defendant's exhibit 1, page 000001) The testimony controverted
Brief Of Appellant
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that assertion as Defendant had removed tools and furniture from
the marital home. In addition, the court did not take into
consideration the fact that Mr. Swensen used marital funds under
his care, custody and control to pay his attorney fees and other
personal expenses attributable to him, such as a $10,996.00 studenl
loan.
Ms. Tanner had no marital assets available to her during the
pendency and was left with a substantial amount of costs and fees
which the court ordered her to pay, some of which Ms. Tanner
borrowed money to cover.
Ms. Tanner worked to support Mr. Swensen while he earned his
degrees and yet an inequitable division of the property was
performed leaving her without sufficient income to support herself
in a manner approaching the standard of living reached during the
marriage. There is not sufficient finding of fact to show that Mse
Tanner can support herself. There is sufficient findings to show
that Mr. Swensen can support himself on his current income. The
property division was not conducted in a manner that reflected the
parties abilities to earn income and has created an inequitable
situation that leaves Ms. Tanner without a means of supporting
herself, and in debt.
POINT 2:
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ALIMONY ISSUE
The parties were married for twenty years. During the course
of the marriage, the parties bought a home, had four children, and
Mr. Swensen established a law practice specializing in tax law.
During the early years of the marriage, Ms. Tanner worked in minor
clerical jobs.

After the family began to grow, Ms. Tanner worked

only intermittently, usually teaching art classes in the summer to
neighborhood

children.

Her

primary

occupation,

during

the

marriage, was raising children, caring for the needs of her husband
and running the couple's home.
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such
orders concerning property distribution and alimony as
are equable. U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 (1984 ed.). See,
e.g., Hiahlev v. Hiahlev, Utah, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (1983);
Doritv v. Poritv, Utah, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (1982); English
v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (1977).

The trial

court must exercise its discretion in accordance with the
standards that have been set by this Court.

In the

present case, we find that the trial court did not comply
with those standards. Jones v. Jonesf 700 P.2d 1072 (Ut.
S.C. 1985) Id Page 2. The court only awarded alimony for
a two year period, even though the evidence demonstrated
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a substantial disparity in income between the parties, as
well as the ability to produce income in the future; that
Plaintiff contributed to the degrees of Defendant, by
working while he was in graduate school and the marriage
was of long duration - twenty years.
In Jones, the court describes the purpose of alimony:
[T]he most important function of alimony is to
provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge, English
v. English, 565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in mind,
the Court in English articulated three factors that must
be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient
income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support."
Id at Page 4.
In the case at hand, nowhere

in the trial court's

decision, its findings of fact, or its statements made on cfa
record at the conclusion of the hearing is there any indication
that the court adequately analyzed the circumstances of the p,^ "
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in light of these three factors. And our attempt to perform this
analysis through a review of the record and evidence compels us to
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in fixing the
alimony award. In addition, the record exemplifies the courts
attitude about the Plaintiff, when the court commented after
Plaintifffs/Appellants

counsel

requested

that the

Plaintiff a beneficiary, along with the children,

court make
on the life

insurance policy of Defendant/Appellee, at least during the period
she had a right to alimony. The court commented: "... I'm concerned
about the protection of the children, not the protection of the
Plaintiff here". Transcripts of (Judge's Ruling, page 7, lines 1214)
The tone and tenor of the entire proceeding evidenced the
court's lack of concern for Plaintiff's/Appellant's rights.
As in Jones, other than the assets awarded her in the property
distribution, Ms. Tanner has no dependable outside income.

As a

result of the success of the law practice of Mr. Swensen, the
couple, as did the parties in Jones, enjoyed a very comfortable
lifestyle.

In the instant case, as in Jones, the wife was awarded

no income-producing assets.
It is almost certain that Ms. Tanner will be unable to
maintain anything even approaching the standard of living she
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enjoyed during the marriage, given the $700 per month alimony
awarded by the trial court for two years and the termination of
that award at that time.
The second factor to be considered in Jones is the wifefs
ability to produce a sufficient income for herself.

Ms. Tanner

was married in her early twenties. Shefs been married for twenty
years. The paid work she did in the early years of the marriage and
the miscellaneous functions she performed during the summer were
all relatively unskilled in nature.

During most of the marriage,

with the full consent and support of her husband, she devoted her
time to raising their four children.

She has no professional

training and few marketable skills.

The husband managed the

finances of both the family and the business and provided his wife
with an allowance to cover her expenses.

The wife has no

independent income. Intermittently, she received from her parents,
from a family corporation which provided some money for taxes. It
is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in her 40 f s, with n©
substantial work experience or training, will be able to enter the
job market and support herself in anything even resembling the
style in which the couple had been living.
The family corporation, Tanner Inc., provided past money that
Ms. Tanner cannot depend upon in the future. As a matter of fact,
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her father has advised Ms. Tanner that she will, in all likelihood,
not receive any future distributions.
The final factor to be considered, as outlined in Jones, is
the ability of the husband to provide support to the wife.

The

record shows that although the husband paid himself an annual
income of approximately $67,472 from the proceeds of his law
practice, the total profits from the business actually amounted to
almost $130,000 per year. While the trial court apparently viewed
the $67,472 as the husband's total annual income for purposes of
determining alimony, in fact he had control over all the profits,
but chose to take only a portion of them as personal income and to
set the rest aside for reinvestment in the business.
Mr. Swensen is an expert in finance and tax as he not only has
a law degree but he is also a certified public account, as well as
having a masters in accounting. During the marriage the Defendant
controlled all the finances, investments, etc., of the couple. As
a matter of fact, Ms. Tanner was unsure, as the divorce proceedings
were initiated in this case, what investments and assets the couple
actually owned.
Ms. Tanner was definitely at a disadvantage regarding the
assets in the marriage.

Even the last figures provided by Mr«

Swensen regarding investments were modified just before trial in
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his exhibits making the figures he provided earlier for Ms. Tanner^
which she used on her exhibits, outdated.

The new figures were

never made available prior to trial even though Mr. Swensen
admitted in his testimony that the parties were going by the last
set of figures provided and there was a cut-off date the parties
had informally agreed upon. Never the less, Mr. Swensenfs figures
had been updated for trial on his exhibits.
The

exhibits

containing

updated

figures which

were not

available to Ms. Tanner constructively nullified her exhibits^
making them inconvenient and literally unusable by the trial courtt
On the record, there is no reason to surmise that the income
generated by the defendant's law practice will decrease in the
future.

The Defendant, therefore, as sole owner, is i n LA'H

excellent position to provide adequate continuing support to his
ex-spouse.

And yet, the trial court ordered alimony for only

period of two years, at a mere $700.00 a month.
Jones, analyzes the apportionment of income in a clos"
corporation between personal and business uses.

It states:

The apportionment of income between personal and
business uses is quite properly a matter left to the
discretion of the husband as owner of the pharmacy and
gift shop. However, how he chooses to allocate that
profit is not binding on the court in determining his
ability to pay alimony to his ex-spouse. The full profit
produced by the business, adjusted by the court to take
into account legitimate and reasonable needs of the
Brief Of Appellant
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA
Page 21

business for additional capital, should have been used as
the basis for assessing the husbandfs ability to provide
for his spouse. In making this analysis, the trial court
should not permit all claims of need for capital on the
part of the business to take precedence over the support
needs of the wife. If these capital needs are a result
of discretionary decisions of the husband to expand and
improve the business, rather than to maintain it in its
present condition, then to permit him to divert income
into the business at the expense of his ex-spousef s
support needs would be to permit him to enrich himself at
her expense.
The analysis and the facts of Jones relate to the present
case.
Both were marriages of long duration.

Both

situations

involved a closed corporation owned and controlled by the husband.
Both wives remained at home involved in domestic duties.

Both

wives had no history of any significant personal income.
As in Jones and the foregoing analysis leads us to the
conclusion in the present case that the trial court's alimony award
was inequitable, both in terms of the initial amount and its
termination.

Ms. Tanner is in her 40fs, possesses few marketable

job skills, and has little hope of ever recovering her former
standard of living.

This is simply not the sort of situation in

which a small alimony is appropriate.

The husband operates a

financially successful business, built up over twenty years of
marriage through the joint efforts of both the husband and the
wife. These facts clearly call for some form of continuing spousal
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maintenance.

The

original

award

must

be

more

substantial

considering the husband's real discretionary income, and should
continue at that level for the foreseeable future.
We believe it is consistent with the goal of equalizing the
parties1 post divorce status to look to the standard of living
existing at or near the time of trial in determining alimony. This
is consonant with the treatment of both marital property and child
support and is better designed to equip both parties to go forward
with their separate lives with relatively equal odds.

It is

further justified because any future changes in alimony are limited
to instances where a material change of circumstances has occurred.
Bridenbaucrh v. Bridenbauqh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) .
Determining

the

standard

of

living

is a

fact-sensitive

and

subjective task. The standard of living cannot be determined by
actual expenses alone.

Those expenses may be necessarily lower

than needed to maintain an appropriate standard of living for any
number of reasons. As Webster says, standard of living includes
"customary

or

proper

status"

considering

the

parties8

circumstances. Those circumstances should be evaluated at the time
of trial. In light of the facts of this case, we conclude that the
trial court erred in not looking at not only the pre-separation
standard of living in setting alimony, but also considering thf
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standard of living "during the marriage" up to the time of trial.
In this case, it was inequitable and an abuse of discretion to
ignore

standard

of

living,

along

with

all

relevant

facts

surrounding it.
The alimony award, in the instant case, does not come close to
equalizing the parties1 standard of living, as Ms. Tanner continues
to be a student with little or no income and Mr. Swensen continues
to build his law practice with substantial income.
As in Howel v. Hovel, 806 P.2d 1209, 155 Utah Adv. Rep., there
was an improper analysis of this point allowing the husband a two
to four times advantage.
Utah's appellate courts have considered the appropriateness of
alimony after a long-term marriage, where the wife (usually) has
worked primarily in the home, has limited job skills, and is in her
late forties or fifties. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076; Rasband, 752 P.2d
1331, 1333.

In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the

supreme court found alimony awarded inadequate to allow the wife a
standard of living even approaching that experienced during the
marriage, and described the marriage as follows:
During most of the marriage, with the full consent and support
of her husband, [the wife] devoted her time to raising their four
children and donating her services to various social service
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organizations... It is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman
in her middle years, with no substantial work experience or
training, will be able to enter the job market and support herself
in anything even resembling the style in which the couple had been
living.
In the present case, the plaintiff spent the majority of her
time raising children and caring for the home.
At this point in time, there is no way plaintiff can even
recoup and catch up to the earning potential of her former husband*
In Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. 24,
the court reviewed this issue pertaining to alimony:
Did the trial court award plaintiff alimony based solely
on defendant's ability to pay rather than on the parties' needs and
income earnings abilities?
The court explains in Sampinos that:
in an action

for divorce, the trial court has

considerable

discretion to provide for spousal support. Bushell v. Bushell, 649
P. 2d 85, 88
findings

(Utah 1982). However, the trial court must make

on all material

issues, and

such findings must be

sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to
reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusions on each
factual issue presented.
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Failure to substantiate such findings

constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of the judgment." Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (quoting Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987)). The courtfs findings in the instant case, do not

include

any facts revealing the steps taken to reach conclusions of how the
court determined the alimony award and without sufficient detail.
(Transcript of Judgefs Ruling)
The Sampino court explain the basis of its alimony award when:
Alimony - Defendant contends that the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding plaintiff alimony based solely on his
ability to pay rather than on the parties1 needs and incomeproducing abilities.

The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated that

the purpose of spousal support is to "enable the receiving spouse
to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a
public charge."

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).

Three factors must be considered in fixing alimony awards: (1) the
financial condition and needs of the spouse claiming support; (2)
the ability of the spouse to produce sufficient income for himself
or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide
the support. Id. at 101.
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The court in the present case seemed to focus solely on the
defendant's ability to pay,neglecting the issue of potential loss
of standard of living and future income in the Plaintiff.

Ms. Tanner is a full time student who hopes to be able to earn
$20,000 per year once she has earned her masters degree. There is
no guarantee that she will be able to realize that hope. In
addition, Ms. Tanner would hope to continue on in her education to
earn a Ph.D., which would push back the time when she would be
qualified to begin work and earn an additional four years. Mrc
Swensen has the potential as an expert in tax law to earn more than
three times what Ms. Tanner only hopes to earn in the future. Mr«
Swensen has a successful law practice and there is no evidence that
his ability to maintain or increase his yearly income will not
change in the future.
Ms. Tanner has no guarantee what her future income will be, or
when she will begin to earn it. The trial court's alimony award
will terminate in two years regardless of her status, employed or
not. Ms. Tanner could easily still be a student without any ability
to produce income after such a short period. This is blatantly
unfair.
The trial court erred in making its alimony award of $700 pe^
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month for a two year period. There was not a sufficient showing of
fact establishing that Ms. Tanner will continue to receive large
disbursements from the Tanner family business nor that she will
earn $20,000 per year in two years. Nor that she will have income
in

two

years.

The

facts

in

the

record

are

not

"clear,

uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor
of the judgment". Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 73 Utah Adv.
Rep. 35 (1988) (quoting Action v. Deleran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987).
The

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

and

created

an

inequitable situation where Ms. Tanner has no idea what her
economic situation will be two years from now. Ms. Tanner may not
be able to find a job making $20,000 per year or she may find that
she is incapable of completing her masters degree. Ms. Tanner may
have no choice in two years but to become a public charge which is
certainly one of the circumstances the award of alimony is designed
to prevent.
The failure of the trial court to make sufficient findings on
this material issue, as well as the short term minimal award is
reversible error.

POINT 3:
Brief Of Appellant
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA
Page 28

IMPUTED PAST INCOME
The trial court abused its discretion in imputing income from
Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art classes in the
summer. Ms. Tanner can no longer participate in the summer art
classes because of her enrollment in year-round graduate school.
The trial court imputed this income for purposes of child support
and alimony. Wherefore the child support and alimony awards should
be figured without using the imputed income amount. Savage v.
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, (Ut. S. Ct. 1983). Weston v. Weston, 773
P.2d 408, 107 Utah Adv. Rep 78. The court was aware that Ms. Tanner
was no longer able to produce extra summer income and yet they
imputed income to her in any case.
In addition, Ms. Tanner had received disbursements of money
from Tanner Inc., in the past but the money historically had been
used to pay income taxes allotted to Ms. Tanner from the business.
There had in the past been some small amounts of money left over
after the taxes were paid but was never a sum large enough to
contribute

to

the

families

living

expenses.

The

last

two

disbursements were larger than the rest however, ($8,000 a piece)
and were attributable to the sale of the family business. Mr.
Maurice Tanner, the president of Tanner, Inc., and Ms. Tanner's
father, informed Ms. Tanner that she would not be receiving any
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future disbursements as large as the ones in the past. She cannot,
therefore, depend on disbursements of money from Tanner, Inc., to
support herself in the future.
As mentioned above, Ms. Tanner had also earned a small income
from teaching Art classes to neighborhood children during the
summer months but this income has also stopped. She was capable of
teaching during the summers because she was not attending school
herself and she could rely upon Mr. Swensenfs income to support the
family

as

the

income

from

teaching

was

not

significant

(approximately $1,500). Ms. Tanner is currently a full-time yearround student. She will not be able to teach the art classes and
continue her education during the summers. If she did teach the
classes it would cause a delay in her obtaining her masters degree
in all probability, as much as a year. Ms. Tanner cannot afford the
delay that teaching the art classes would cause. Ms. Tanner has no
future plans to earn income from teaching art during the summer
months•
The trial court, however, imputed the income that Ms. Tanner
made in the past from the two above mentioned

sources when

determining the amount of child support and alimony awards. The
court in Wiley v. Wiley, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), faced a similar problem. The trial court found that Mrs.
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Wiley was capable of earning an income of between $1,500 and $2,000
per month, based on her education and qualifications. The trial
court had not made its award based upon the Jones factors, which
include Mrs. Wileyfs financial need, Mr. Wiley1s financial need,
and the ability of Mr. Wiley to provide support. Id.
In the instant case, the trial court did not look at Ms.
Tanner's actual ability to support herself and what her financial
needs were. She was no longer capable of teaching art classes
during the summer and she would no longer be receiving large
disbursements of money from Tanner Inc. The potential for income
from these two sources were no longer present yet the trial court
used these factors in its computations. Using these factors instead
of the Jones factors is reversible error by the trial court.

POINT 4:
PRE-INHERITANCE/PREMARITAL

PROPERTY

Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner Inc. qualifies as a preinheritance gift and the court should not have utilized the family
corporation in any capacity in figuring child support or alimony,
as it was not income but a property interest. Typically, inherited
property will be awarded to the person who inherited it, even when
the property was inherited during the marriage• In Preston ye
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Preston. 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982), the court stated that
inheritance acquired during the marriage was property excluded from
the valuation of the marital assets.
In the instant case the property interest was inherited before
the marriage. The Tanner family corporation was formed 35 years ago
and predates the marriage. The disbursements of money sent to Ms.
Tanner over the course of the 19 year marriage were sent mainly to
cover Ms. Tanner's personal taxes with only several hundred dollars
left over to go to personal use. The large disbursements of $8,000
were the result of one of the family businesses being sold and Ms.
Tanner has been informed that no future disbursements of $8,000
will be forthcoming.
At no point, however, were the disbursements made that could
be used to support the couple. The assets derived from Tanner Inc.
were never commingled with the Swensen family funds except in the
paying of personal taxes. None of the Swensen family property was
purchased with funds acquired from Tanner Inc.
Mr. Swensen has not augmented or maintained Tanner Inc., in
any way.
The assets brought into the marriage by one party that were
not commingled with the family assets should be excluded from the
valuation

of the marital assets. The court
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in Jesperson

v.

Jesperson.

610 P.2d

326, 328

(Utah 1980),

said

it was not

unreasonable for the trial court to withdraw from marital property
the equivalent of assets brought into the marriage.
Tanner Inc. was structured as a Family Corporation whose
holdings primarily included land. Ms. Tanner was not a salaried
employee of Tanner Inc. She did not receive regular disbursements
of money. Her siblings also received equal disbursements to those
she received. The corporation was structured with the purpose of
transferring inheritable property to the Tanner children, prior to
the death of the Tanner parents.
The court erred in determining that funds secured from Tanner
Inc. was income to Ms. Tanner, in determining an equitable support
award. At the very least, if the court dismisses the premise that
the Tanner Inc. proceeds were pre-inheritance properties, it must
certainly consider those proceeds pre-marital.
The general rule regarding premarital property as expressed in
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Ut. App 1989), is that "(b)fore a
trial court can include either of the parties1 premarital property
in the marital estate, it must find unique circumstances that
warrant disregarding the general rule that premarital property is
separate property", (emphasis added). There must be a sufficiently
detailed finding to show how the trial court determined that the
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premarital property should be included in the marital estate. Id.
In the instant case, there was no detailed finding explaining
how the trial court warranted including the disbursements received
in the past in any capacity in figuring child support or alimony.
The court committed error in doing so, as the family corporation
monies were not income but a property interest that was preinheritance or at the very least premarital in nature.

POINT 5:
IMPUTED FUTURE INCOME
The trial court abused its discretion in finding that Ms.
Tanner could earn $20,000 a year in two years, after she completed
her education. The trial court awarded Ms. Tanner $700 per month
alimony that will terminate in two years presumably on the premise
that she would finish her masters degree in recreational therapy
and obtain employment at $20,000 per year.
Obtaining a masters degree is a demanding pursuit that is
attempted by many and finished by few. There is no guarantee that
Ms. Tanner will be able to finish the work for the masters degree
or that her work will be sufficient to actually earn the degree. In
addition, Ms. Tanner stated that she hoped to obtain employment
after receiving her masters degree making $20,00 per year. She did
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not indicate that she had already secured employment at that rate
of pay. There is again no guarantee that Ms. Tanner will be able to
secure employment at all when she receives her degree. She has not
determined the availability of job openings in her area, nor what
the actual pay schedules are.
The court in Wiley v. Wiley. 227 Ut. Adv. Rep. 39 (1993),
indicated that imputing income in the determination of alimony
based on potential future income would be pure speculation. The
alimony award "cannot be premised upon mere conjecture; instead, it
demands

a

careful

and precise assessment

requiring

detailed

findings". Id.
There can be no detailed findings regarding Ms. Tannerfs
potential income in two years. To attempt to do so would be
speculative and pure conjecture. Even if Ms. Tanner has the
potential to earn $20,000 a year when and if she receives her
degree, there is no guarantee that she will realize her potential.
As stated in Wiley, the alimony award and itfs termination cannot
be premised upon speculation and conjecture. The trial court erred
is this case by doing just that.

POINT 6:
ATTORNEY FEES
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The

trial

court

abused

its discretion

in not

awarding

attorney's fees to Ms. Tanner. "In divorce cases, an award of
attorney fees must be supported by evidence that it is reasonable
in amount and reasonably needed by the party requesting the award".
Huck v. HucX, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986); Sinclair v. Sinclair, 718
P.2d 396 (Utah 1986); Pusev v. Pusev. 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986);
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).
Ms. Tanner's counsel presented an itemized bill showing the
reasonableness of the fees for the amount of time spent on the
case. The fees were shown to be comparable with those of other
attorneys in the region doing a comparable amount of work.
Ms. Tanner's financial need of the award of attorney fees was
also shown. She was a full-time student at the time of trial and
had no income. Ms. Tanner could not expect to receive another large
disbursement of money from Tanner Inc. In fact, Maurice Tanner, the
president of the corporation, and Ms. Tanner's father, informed her
that the large disbursements were the result of the sale of a
family business and not likely to be repeated in the future. Ms.
Tanner had no income on which to rely for her attorney fees. Ms.
Tanner also testified that she had borrowed money from her Father
to pay attorney fees. Mr. Swensen on the other hand, operated a
successful law practice with a monthly income of $5,625.
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The reasonableness of the fees was shown as well as the
reasonableness of the need for the award yet the trial court
ordered each party to bear and be responsible to pay their own
attorney's fees and costs. This is clearly an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court.
Ms. Tanner comes now before this Court requesting that she be
awarded attorney fees on appeal.

POINT 7:
CLOSING ARGUMENT DENIED
The

trial

court

abused

its discretion

in not

allowing

Plaintiff's counsel to present closing argument and cases relevant
to the case before the court.
In Bunnell v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d
1331, 31 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 1987) , the Utah Supreme Court
reversed and remanded a decision by an administrative law judge who
refused to listen to closing argument. When Bunnell^ counsel
offered argument assessing the evidence before the admission of the
medical records on which the administrative law judge had made his
decision, the judge told him to save the argument for rehearingo
The judge indicated that he had already decided to hold against
Bunnell without even examining the medical records.
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In the instant case Ms. Tannerfs counsel was not allowed to
present argument which would have included a presentation of the
Jones factors, issues of pre-marital property, pre-inheritance
property, and an analysis of the property distribution. The Supreme
Court went on to say in Bunnell, that "every agency has a due
process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal".
The Supreme Court concluded that, "the administrative law judgefs
conduct so far diverged from that which would be expected from an
impartial judge that we agree with plaintiff that his right to due
process was violated".
Ms. Tanner's due process rights were violated in the instant
case just as in Bunnell. Ms. Tannerfs counsel was prepared to
present case law that dealt with the issues before the court but
was not allowed to do so. The trial court did not make the alimony
award or the property distribution according to legal precedent
that counsel was prepared to present to the court. (Record at 192,
lines 20-24)

CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion by not using the Jones
factors when making its alimony award, the division of property,
and in itfs decision not to award attorney fees to Plaintiff. The
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trial court imputed past income to Ms. Tanner that she will not
receive in the future in the form of monies earned as an art
teacher during the summer, and large money disbursements from the
Tanner family corporation that historically had always been used
for taxes and a minimal amount used for her personal use. The trial
court also imputed future income on the presumption that Ms. Tanner
will complete her Masters Degree program and locate a job that will
pay her $20,000 a year, clear speculation. These are all clear
cases of the abuse of the trial courtfs discretion that has created
a serious inequity.
Ms. Tanner has no income producing property and her only hope
is to earn a masters degree and find a job. Ms. Tanner has no
current income on which she can rely. Mr. Swensen is a successful
tax attorney with a masters degree in accounting, as well as being
a Certified Public Accountant. His estimated income for the year
1993 was $67,500. In two years regardless of whether Ms. Tanner has
employment at the income amount she hopes, the alimony award will
terminate. She will be left with no income producing property, no
alimony income and the possibility of no employment. She may be
forced to become a public charge.
This will all be the result of the failure of the trial court
to make an equitable alimony award as well as equitably and fairly
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distributing the couples property. In addition, Ms. Tanner's
counsel was prepared to present case law pertaining to the Jones
factors in issues of property division, support and attorney fees,
in closing argument, but was not allowed to do so. The court
refused to protect the rights of the Plaintiff and the judgment of
the court clearly reflects this refusal.

Dated this 19th day of August, 1994.
Respectfully submitted,

Crippen, McConkie & Cline, LC

Kathleen McConkie, Esq.
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2 I

THE COURT:

The parties and counsel are present:.

3

I've now had the opportunity to further consider the

4

exhibits received as well as the testimony elicited in this

5

matter, and I am prepared to rule.

6

In this matter the parties married on November

7

1974, and they have had four children.

8

over the age of majority.

9

22nd,

One now is, however,

The plaintiff is a college graduate attending

graduate

10

school from which she will receive her Masters degree within

11

the next two years.

12
13

The defendant has two graduate degrees, a Masters of
Accountancy and a law degree.

14 |

The parties have each sought a divorce on the grounds

15

of irreconcilable differences and I have heard

16

grounds to grant the divorce to each of the parties on that

17

basis.

18

sufficient

The plaintiff is awarded custody of the minor

19

children of the parties, subject to reasonable visitation by

20

the defendant, or in the event reasonable visitation can not

21

be agreed upon, the Third District Court Commissioner's

22

recommended schedule will pertain.

23 J

The parties have each retained experts to evaluate

24 [defendant's law practice.

I find that the more credible,

25 I reliable evaluation is that of Mr. Shields, Exhibit 11,

i pages 22 and 23, and accordingly adopt the same.
2

The parties have each submitted proposed distributions

3 of marital property.

I find that the more credible, reliable

4

distribution proposal to be that of the defendanr at Exhibit

5

11, tab 1, pages 1 and 2, and accordingly adopt the same.

6

Based upon the credible, believable evidence, I find,

7

for purposes of calculation of child support:, the

8

defendant's gross monrhly income to be $5,625.

9

Exhibit 11, page 42, which shows a projected annual income

That is from

Ifve simply divided that

10

for the year of 1993 of $67,500.

H

by 12.

12

Exhibit 11, tab 4.

12

donations which the defendant indicates he has not and can

14

not pay.

15

His monthly expenses I find to be $2108.

That's

That, of course, excludes the $300 in

The evidence establishes the plaintiff's income and

16

imputable income to total $1000 per month.

17

calculated by the determination that she received $8000

18

from her distribution of the family cQrporationf she is

19

capable of earning $1500 during the summer teaching art,

20

and she has received $2500 in student stipend for a total of

21

$12,000, divided by 12, equals $1000 per month.

22

accordingly, is to be calculated pursuant to the Uniform

23

Child Support Guideline based upon those two gross income

24

figure amounts.

25

That is

Support,

The defendant is ordered to maintain health and acciden

insurance on the children.

Each of the parties are ordered

to pay one-half of any noncovered medical expenses.

The

3 | defendant is to maintain the existing life insurance
4

I policies which he has on his own life, designating the

5 I minor children of the parties as beneficiaries.
6

Each party is awarded the respective personal property

7 J in their possession and each parry is ordered to pay and
8

satisfy the debts incurred by them since the date of

9

separation, October 1, 1992.

10

Given the plaintiff's financial condition, that is,

11

$1000 per month income, both income and imputable income,

12 with her expenses at $2885, which I find is the reasonable
13

figure that is determined by taking Exhibit 6, which is

14

$3417, deducting therefrom her $372 in donations which she

15 J can not afford to pay, and deducting therefrom the $160 for
16

the "other" category which she could not explain, less the

17

support payment which will be approximately what is now

18

being paid, that being about $1286, though I have not

19

calculated the final figure, the plaintiff has shown a need

20

for alimony and the defendant has the ability to pay, but his

21

disposable earnings which are $3671 from Exhibit 11, page

22

42, less the approximate $1286 in support that he will have

23

to pay, less his monthly expenses of approximately $2108,

24

he can not pay, in my judgment, any more than he is already

25

paying.

Accordingly, I also determine that the plaintiff,

1

however, can not receive any less than she is already

2

receiving,

3

|

m

ariQ

accordingly, I order that the S700 per month

alimony continue to be paid.

However, plaintiff will

4

complete her schooling within two years, at which time she

5

anticipates that she will be able to earn 520,000 per year

6

income.

7

terminate at the conclusion of two years from this date,

8

from the date of the next payment that will, in all

9

likelihood, be the month of January, January 1.

It is my order, therefore, that the alimony will

Alimony,

10

therefore, will terminate two years from that date, and

n

moreover, it will terminate upon the usual happening of

12

the events such as remarriage by the plaintiff, cohabiting

13 I with a member of the opposite sex without the benefit of
marriage, et cetera,

14

15 j

Given the fact that the defendant will be paying

1

6 J the support for these children and given the fact that his

17 I earnings are considerably more than the plaintiff's, I order
18

that he be able to take the tax deductions for the children,

19

the minor children, for whom he will be paying support,

20

so long as he is current in the payment of that obligation.

21

j

After the distribution which I have adopted here,

22

the plaintiff will be the owner of approximately $92,000

23

worth of property in assets, plus she will continue to own

24

her eight percent interest in the family corporation, the

25

Tanner Family Corporation, which represents a considerable

1

value in her own right.

2

will not need assistance in the payment of her attorney ! s

3

fees and moreover, I'm persuaded that there's been no

4

evidentiary basis upon which to make such an order and

5

I decline to order that attorney's fees be paid by the

6

defendant or vice-versa.

7

own fees and costs in this matter.

8

I am therefore persuaded that she

Each party is ordered to pay their

M r . Okazaki, you prepare the Findings of

Fact,

9 J Conclusions of Law and Decree, submit them to M s . McConkie
10

for approval as to form.

11

Are there any questions?

12

MR. OKAZAKI:

13

Oh, one thing.

14 j

M S . McCONKIE:

I have one question, your Honor.

15 j

MR. OKAZAKI:

On the visitation arrangement, the

N o , sir.

16 | parties stipulated that we should adopt the advisory
17

language in the Code respecting the access to schools, et

18

cetera.

19

Does the Court recall that?

THE COURT:

I do, and I frankly wanted to leave it at

20

reasonable on the assumption that the parties might expand

21

that, but that's the reason I say that if they are not able

22

to expand it by agreement, then that schedule will pertain.

23
24

25

MR. OKAZAKI:

What I'm talking about is the advisory

language.

THE COURT:

The access to records, y e s , I will order

that.
MS. McCONKIE:

Your Honor, the plaintiff would like

to have her maiden name restored.
THE COURT:

She may certainly have it.

MS. McCONKIE:

Thank you, and in terms of the life

insurance policy, could she be one-half beneficiary for at
least the term of the alimony and could the children be
one-half beneficiary and she could as well, for the term o:
the alimony?
THE COURT:

No, no, I'm not persuaded that's either

appropriate or necessary, counsel.
property in her own right.

She has considerable

I'm concerned about the

protection of the children, not the protection of the
plaintiff here.
MS. McCONKIE:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

All right, counsel.

We 1 11 be in recess.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
•

*

*
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2
3
4 | STATE OF UTAH
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5 | COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
6
7 I

I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify:

8

Thar I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License No.

9

220, and one of the official court reporters of the state

10

of Utah; that on the 16th day of December, 1993, I attended

11

the within matter and reported in shorthand the proceedings

12

had thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand

13

proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting, and the

14

foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 7, inclusive, constitute

15

a full, true and correct account of the Judge ! s Ruling,

16

to the best of my ability.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 524-1000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MAURIA T. SWENSEN
Plaintiff,

:

AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE

:
:
:

Civil No.
924902803DA
Honorable Dennis J. Frederick

v.
JAMES G. SWENSEN, JR.,
Defendant.

:

This matter came on for Trial on the 16th day of December at
10:00 a.m. in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Dennis

J.

Frederick, Third

District

Court Judge, presiding.

Witnesses testified, exhibits were received, argument of the
counsel was considered, file and pleadings were reviewed, the Court
being

thereby

fully

informed, having

heretofore

entered

its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being otherwise fully
advised in the premises, now therefore, it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The parties are mutually awarded a Decree of Divorce, to

become final and absolute as of the date of December 16, 1993, upon

the date of signing and entry thereof by the Court pursuant to the
provisions of U.C.A. § 30-3-7 (1953 as amended).
CHILDREN
2.

The Plaintiff is hereby awarded custody of the minor

children subject to reasonable visitation by the Defendant.
VISITATION
3.

The minimum visitation schedule shall be as set forth in

§ 30-3-35 of the Utah Code Ann, including the following:
a.

one

weekday

evening

to

be

specified

by

the

noncustodial parent from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.;
b.

alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend
after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on
Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each
year;

c.

holidays

take

precedence

over

the

weekend

visitation, and changes shall not be made to the
regular

rotation

of

the

alternating

weekend

visitation schedule;
d.

in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial
parent is entitled to visitation on Human Rights
Day, Easter, Memorial Day, July 24th, Veteran's
Day, Day before or after each child's birthday from
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. and the first half of

100352.kao

2

Christmas Vacation, including Christmas Eve and
Christmas Day to 1:00 p.m.
e.

in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial
parent is entitled to visitation on New Year's Day,
President's Day, July 4th until 11:00 p.m., Labor
Day, Columbus Day, UEA weekend from Wed. 6:00 p.m.
to Sun. 7:00 p.m., each child's actual birthday
beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., including
taking the other siblings along for the birthday,
Thanksgiving from Wed. 7:00 p.m. to Sun. 7:00 p.m.,
and the second half of Christmas Vacation, 1:00
p.m. to 9:00 p.m. Christmas Day;

f.

Father's Day shall be spent with the father every
year;

g.

Mother's Day shall be spent with the mother every
year;

h.

extended visitation with the noncustodial parent
shall

be

four weeks of

consecutive

visitation

during the summer at the option of the noncustodial
parent; or, if year round, 1/2 of the vacation time
for year-round

school breaks, custodial parent

allowed two week uninterrupted;
i.
100352.kao

notification of extended visitation or vacation
3

weeks with the children shall be provided at least
30 days in advance to the other parent; and
j.
4,

telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours.

The advisory guidelines as stated in § 30-3-33 of the

Utah Code Ann, are hereby adopted and include the following:
a.

visitation

shall

be

utilized

to

maximize

the

continuity and stability of the children's lives;
b.

special consideration shall be given by each parent
to make the children available to attend family
functions

including

funerals, weddings,

family

reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies,
and other significant events in the lives of the
children or in the life of either parent which may
inadvertently

conflict

with

the

visitation

schedule;
c.

the noncustodial parent shall pick up the children
at the times specified and return the children at
the times specified, and the children's regular
school hours shall not be interrupted;

d.

the custodial parent shall have the children ready
for visitation at the time they are to be picked up
and shall be present at the custodial home or shall
make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive

100352.kao
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the children at the time they are returned;
e.

neither

visitation

nor

child

support

shall be

withheld due to either parent's failure to comply
with a court-ordered visitation schedule;
f.

the custodial parent shall notify the non-custodial
parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all
significant school, social, sports, religious, and
community

functions

participating

in which

or

being

the

children

honored,

and

are
the

noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and
participate fully;
g.

the noncustodial parent shall have access directly
to all

school

reports

including

preschool

and

daycare reports and medical records and shall be
notified immediately by the custodial parent in the
event of a medical emergency;
h.

each parent shall provide the other with their
current address and telephone number within 24
hours of any change;

i.

each parent shall permit and encourage liberal
telephone

contact

during

reasonable

hours

and

uncensored mail privileges with the children;
j.
100352.kao

parental care shall be presumed to be better care
5

for

the

parties

children
shall

noncustodial

than

surrogate

cooperate

parent,

if

care

in

and

the

allowing

willing

and

the

able,

to

provide child care;
k.

each

parent

providers

shall

with

the

provide

all

surrogate

name, current

care

address, and

telephone number of the other parent and shall
provide the noncustodial parent with the name,
current

address, and

telephone

number

of

all

surrogate care providers unless the court for good
cause orders otherwise; and
1.

each parent shall be entitled to an equal division
of

major

religious

holidays

celebrated

by

the

parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious
holiday that the other parent does not celebrate
shall have the right to be together

with the

children on the religious holiday.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
5.

The parties7 property is awarded as follows:
a.

The Plaintiff is awarded $374.15 of the USAA money

market account (account no. 42901560486) with the remaining
balance awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim
by the Plaintiff.
100352.kao
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b.

The Defendant is awarded $895.86 of the 1992 Tax

Refund with the remaining balance awarded to the Plaintiff
free and clear of any claim by the Defendant.
c.

The Franklin Telecom and Mining Services securities

are awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim by
the Plaintiff.
d.

Plaintiff is awarded the personal property in her

possession valued at approximately $5,000 less any exclusions
pursuant to the terms of this Order.
e. Plaintiff is awarded the 1990 Caravan, 1985 Reliant,
and the 1981 Reliant free and clear of any claim by the
Defendant.
f.

Defendant is awarded the 1992 Honda Accord free and

clear of any claim by the Plaintiff.
g. Plaintiff is awarded the marital residence located at
2615 East Lincoln Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with
the sole responsibility for any obligation owing thereon, free
and clear of any claim by the Defendant.
h.

Defendant is awarded the proceeds from the contract

sale of the Crest Drive property free and clear from any claim
by the Plaintiff.
i.

Defendant is awarded his professional practice free

and clear from any claim by the Plaintiff•
100352.kao
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j.

Plaintiff is awarded the Dreyfus IRA account

(account no. 039-0560055352) in the amount of $3,359.34 free
and clear of any claim by Defendant.
1.

Defendant is awarded the Dreyfus IRA account

(account no. 039-0556358836) in the amount of $6,717.55 free
and clear of any claim by Plaintiff.
m.

Plaintiff is awarded $3,138.23 from the USAA money

market account (account no. 42901704138) with the remaining
balance awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim
by the Plaintiff.
n.

Plaintiff is awarded $508.96 from the USAA CRST

account (account no. 51902459719) with the remaining balance
awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim by the
Plaintiff.
o.

Plaintiff is awarded $1,064.18 from the USAA Gold

account (account no. 50901211141) with the remaining balance
awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim by the
Plaintiff.
p.

Plaintiff is awarded $16,519.00 from the investment

note with the remaining interest awarded to the Defendant free
and clear of any claim by the Plaintiff.
q.

Plaintiff is awarded $1,723.00 from the FEGB Ltd.

Partnership
100352.kao

with

the

remaining
8

interest

awarded

to

the

Defendant free and clear of any claim by the Plaintiff.
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
6.

The retirement accounts shall be divided pursuant to a

Qualified Domestic Relations Order within the meaning of §414(p) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
DEFENDANT'S INCOME
7.

The Defendant has a gross monthly income of $5,625 and

monthly expenses of $2,108.
PLAINTIFF'S INCOME
8.

The Court hereby imputes income to the Plaintiff in the

amount of $1,000 per month and monthly expenses of $2,885.
CHILD SUPPORT
9.

Child support calculated pursuant to the uniform child

support guidelines

and based

upon the gross

income

for the

Defendant of $5,625 per month and the gross income of $1,000
attributable to the Plaintiff is $1,209.55 per month to be paid by
the Defendant to the Plaintiff.
HEALTH INSURANCE
10.

The

Defendant

shall

maintain

health

and

accident

insurance for the minor children and shall deduct the premium from
the child support amount. Each of the parties shall be ordered to
pay one-half of any non-covered medical expenses.
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LIFE INSURANCE
11.

The Defendant shall maintain his existing life insurance

policy which he presently has on his own life and shall designate
the minor children as beneficiaries thereunder.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
12.

Each party shall be awarded their respective personal

property presently in their possession except as specifically
divided pursuant to the terms hereof.
13•

Defendant is awarded the piano, antique sewing machine,

and remodeling tools presently in the possession of the Plaintiff.
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
14.

Each party shall pay and satisfy the personal debts

incurred by them since the date of separation, October 1, 1992, and
shall indemnify and hold the other harmless therefrom.
ALIMONY
15. The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff the sum of $700 per
month in alimony commencing January l, 1994, which shall terminate
automatically on January 1, 1996.
16.

Further, alimony shall terminate, in addition to the

terms as stated above, upon the re-marriage of the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff residing with a person of the opposite sex without the
benefit of marriage or any other statutory or legal grounds for
termination of alimony.
100352.kao
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TAX EXEMPTIONS
17.

The Defendant is awarded the tax deductions for the minor

children for whom he will be paying support so long as he is
current in the payment of that support obligation.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
18.

Each party shall bear and be responsible to pay their own

attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.
MAIDEN NAME
19.

The Plaintiff is hereby restored to the use of her maiden

name of "Tanner."
DATED t h i s Z^y'd

day of ~7?^C' .1* - '
C

/ 1994.

BY THE COURT:

i ~A
Dennis J. Frederick
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

Kathleen McConki'e
Attorney for the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of February, 1994, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce was handdelivered to the following:
Kathleen McConkie
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Ingrid S. Westphal
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In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH
M a u r i a T. Swensen
Case No..

92^902303DA

Plaintiff
vs.
James G. Swensen

Financial Declaration
Dated

Defendant
Husband:
Address: _

. J u l y 1 5 , 1993

Wife: Mauria T . Swensen
Address: 261.5 E a s t L i n c o l n Lane
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT ^ 1 2 4

Soc. Sec. No.:

Soc. Sec. No.: 5 3 5 - 2 ^ - 2 ^ 7

Occupations

Occupation:

Student

Employer:

Employer:

n

/a

Birthdate:

Birthdate:

May 1 7 , 195**

NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR
ITS DECISION.
ANY FALSE S T A T E M E N T MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
( N O T E : To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and
deductions are made weekly, multiplYJ)y 4.3; if figures are on a bi-weekly
basis, multiply by 2.167)
1.

Gross monthly income from:
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses,
allowances and overtime, payable
period)
Pensions and retirement
Social security
Disability and unemployment insurance
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment, etc.).
Child support from any prior marriage
Dividends and interest
Rents
All other sources: (Specify).

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME _
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income:
State and federal income taxes
Number of exemptions taken
Social security
Medical or other insurance (describe fully).
Union or other dues
Retirement or pension fund
Savings plan
Credit union

HUSBAND

WIFE

S

S

$
js

s
s

(pay

j

Other: (specify)

3.

Net monthly income - take home pay

4.

Debts and obligations:
Creditor's Name

1

$
$

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS

Balance

Date Payable

For

1$
1$

Monthly Payment

i
TOTAL

i
i
i

i
i
i

!S

!

$

(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule)
5.

All propeny of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband, (W) Wife, (J) Jointly).
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFHCIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTLNG PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE.
Value

(a) Household furnishings, furniture,
appliances and equipment
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) 1 9 9 0 D ^ d ^ e

$

Owed Thereon

$

3,000.00

unknown

Caravan
|

1
(c) Securities - stocks, bonds

(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans,
credit unions - savings and checking)

Key Bank - 629^1^99'+

^0,00

|
1

1

1
1

1
Policv No.

Name
Name
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify)

1
dividend, or loan amount

Face Amount

$

(f) Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts

!

Cash value, accumulated

(e) Life Insurance:
Name of Company

1

$

Value of interest and amount presently vested

1

Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional property)
Address.

Type of Property

Original Cost S

Total Present Value S_

Cost of Additions $

Basis of Valuation

Date of Acquisition

Total Cost $
Mtg. Balance S
Other Liens S
Equity S
And to whom

Monthly Amortization .
Taxes $
Individual contributions

Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness)

Other assets (Specify)

Total monthly expenses: *(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose
expenses are included.)

*

HUSBAND

Mauria S wens en ( c u s t o d i a l isarent^
Daughters ( A l i s o n , Clare)
Sons (Nate, Tanner)

WIFE

S

Rent or mortaase payments (residence)

'

Real property taxes (residence)

1

S

720.00

Real property insurance (residence)

•

'

Maintenance (residence)

!

1

Food and household supplies
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat

!

!

-* *
-'

* '. ..

I'O.T)

Telephone

|

Laundry and cleaning
Clothins
Medical
Dental

'
1
i
1

1
i
|
i

Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liabilitv. disability) Exclude Pavroll Deducted

*

|

Child Care

!

Payment of child spousal support re: prior marriage

1

1
1

School

i

i

Is c _ n n

10.00
2^0.00
200.00

?7Q.*n

Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation).

210.00

Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations)

^72.10

Transportation (other than automobile)

10.00
I'H.'V)

Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance)
Auto payments
Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof)
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule).
TOT AT FYPPNKPS

160.00

3,4-i7.o:>

Wife's ( x )

husband's ( )

Proposed Settlement of Pending
Divorce Litigation
Child Support $

Total (per month) S

Alimony:

Total (per month) $

1,^00.00

Property Distribution:
M a u r i a Swens 5 en:

Jewelry (gifts to me ). Pistol (gift from my father). Sewing equipmant. Honda car.
Silver (gift from my grandmother).

Tools and all yard equipment for yard and home

upkeep (defendant has an apartment).

Art (my personal art work).

Furnishings and

accessories presently in the home (to maintain more stability for the children, to
maintain the home, because I personally acquired most of the furnishings by babysitting
or my parents gave things to us. King bed.
2 tables. Linen chest. Desk.

Chest. Nightstand, Lamp. Sofa. 2 chair;

2 Lamps. Microwave. Dining set. Kitchen set. TV and

VCR. Entertainment center. Barbequer.

Refrigerator.

Washer and dryer. Household

equipment and; supplies. Children's personal furnishings and equipment. Home at
Lincoln Lane. Defendant pays all attorney fees incurred during entire divorce proceedii
Defendant pays all taxes, penalities, and interest for 1992 state and federal taxes.
S^le custody of all four of our children. Half of all marital assets, his business
included.

All^w me to take at least two of the four children as deductions on tax

returns.

GRAND TOTAL (per month) S.
I,

VVCUA/4H (A T

^Vl^4^Ao40

9

propose the above settlement.

Plaintiff/Defendant
If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately
be called for this party.

hours and

witnesses will

STATE OF UTAH
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct,
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
' s

day of

)
^ f-LLM

n 1 iJlJ

.19 9 8

CYNTHIA EOTXWCOIL
Notary Public
Notary Public residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
STATE OF UTAH
is} My Commission Expire*
$
March 11.1994
402SSW«ighad.Sl£ UT 84124 _
m u u u u • u J J i i ijfly Commission Expires:
^.//•W

BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION. INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX
RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS.
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.
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In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH
M AixA-fA

r.

£ D <TA) S/rAJ
Plaintiff

Case No. ?Z<+90Z.86

Financial Declaration

vs.

•TAMPS

6.

Husband:

SAMCS 6

AIMTRW

P.O. &'*
SALT

SoJetOSsr/O.r*
Defendant
^)fA/if/;.tf,

Wife:

LAKtr

Dated: AU& . '3. {?<?*
SW£AJ f€T*/

Address:

/99/
CJTY.cJrAtf

-3I3Q

SZ7-73L

Occupation: _
Employer

A ToAveY

Occupation:

J±L£

Employer:

f£&. 23. f<fSe>

2J>tf

IrtiOstN

IA+J6

<urr .urArt
XBS-1* - zotn

S4LT LA£€

SW/6

Soc. Sec. No.:

Birthdate:

3 1>A

Soc. Sec. No.:

Binhdate:

&TuO <TAJ T

—
.. _Mli._ZZ. /tjy.

_.

NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR
ITS DECISION.
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4 .3; if figures are on a bi-weekly
basis, multiply by 2.167)
1.

Gross monthly income from;
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses,
allowances and overtime, payable _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (pay
Period) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ » _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _
Pensions and retirement
Social securiry
Disability and unemployment insurance
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment, etc.).
Child support from any prior marriage
Dividends and interest
Rents
All other sources: (Specify).

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME _
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income:
State and federal income taxes
Number of exemptions taken
Social security
Medical or other insurance (describe fully).
Union or other dues .
Ret»r#»m^nt r\r « » « « » « « f..-,#4

HUSBAND

"WIFE

S

1

I

1

(

I $s

I5s
1

1

s

r.6
2S.ot>
) A b7 .IS

/

Y3a.3r

!

*hen (specify),

5

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS
L

Net monthly income • take home pay

L

Debts and obligations:

L_!

For

Creditors Name

$

3, SHI t&
Balance

Date Payable

ttOK>£

Z.o3S.e>t> %

Monthly Payment

1

1
i
1
|
!

TOTAL

l*

_^L_L*

(If insufficient space, insert to til and attach schedule)
5.

All property of the parties known io me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband, (W) Wife, (J) Jointly).
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE.
Value
(a) Household furnishings, furniture.

$

(j4)

appliances and equipment

Owed Thereon

7&0*o* %

o

(&>}

(b) Automobile (Year-Make)

/99

Z

HetfQA

/91*
/9QS

/ V 2S"0.o*
X 9oo **
S'o o, o o

(rt)

#*&££
(iol
PLYteUTX (H)

O
0
o

I
(c) Securities - stocks, bonds

2.** *U
T*tKlK)£A

/rz)

.TAN*-.

)i.**
!ZS. 0*

(Tl

e* *L An

Mi»w& $szi4<^r<-

?

CUJ)

(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings &. loans,
credit unions - savings and checking)

l/SM

AtMGV

71Z.U

MAfKe-T

Cash value, accumulated

(e) Life Insurance:
Policy No.

Name of Company

S 1+06, oob

$ 4~ fgAM

Value of interest and amount presently vested

( 0 Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts

Name tM* Ql£Y{ut
Name Ik* * DfiXY fu*

dividend, or loan amount

Face Amount

JA*rs

rtucj0&e»)
C6-3*-U)
A W / I / A Su£A)S>Z*S (£>'$*'?*)

3*31.8/

(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify)

PA ~ C45AK

tf/H

/6-So-W)
Aa.-Jj

vr.aJLf 47
A3

¥16.74

/

\ 11°

Real P^»t» (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, aaach sheet with identical informabon for all additional property)
l~A/j£
TVPC of Property
X£S 11> S?A) C^T
Address
7U-/
£ IS/JC0LN

LAKF

SAL.T
Oripnai Cost $

,

cfryMrfirtitlzV

Date of Acquisition _

JTHJLL*

Tctal Present Value $ *pf/u>tAs*J

_J

\°l6Z
u~

f)A^>^^L^

Basis of Valuatioa

Cost of Additions S
Total CostS
Mtg. Balance $
Other Liens X ,

* 6B St*
m

,,

Equity $
And to whom

Monthly Amortization _
Taxes S
Individual contributions

)

Business interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness)

Other assets (Specify)

//.*&-*+

Total monthly expenses: *(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose
expenses are included.)

HUSBAND

* /to)

WIFE

4 £-uLSt*<l>U /0e>*4~3~
$

AL/Mo»Y
CL-HtLD

S

1

/.</9S.**
££"£ . a*

StA-PA>*r

Rent or mortgage payments (residence) _,..,

? €>& . *0

_

Real property taxes (residence)
fZ.**>

Real property insurance (residence)

XD. e>o

Maintenance (residence)

ZVr.00

Food and household supplies

&.**
Zt **

Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat
Telephone
Laundry and cleaninc
Clothing

ZP. to
ft .£>•

Medical

6S~*o

!

Dental
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liability, disability) Exclude Payroll Deducted

16}

.00

l*o

,*o

Child Care .
Payment of child spousal support rt: prior marriage
School
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation)
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations)

.,.„„ .

.„

&>.#*

m

Transportation (other than automobile)
Auto expense ($as. oil. repair, insurance)
Auto payments

1
rfO.OO

Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule
if not fully set forth in (d) on the firsr page hereof)

!

Husband's (^)

Wife's ( )

Proposed Settlement of Pending
Divorce Litigation
Child Supports
Alimony:

f*R

f

ySARS

Total (per month) $

/</9B.*e>

Total (permonth) $

? ' * • oe>

Property Distribution:
/SSAA

Ms^; At^le./-

Ji'Ajd'*
' • " " -

'

^U^U»
/f,*^
—=
— —

XA/> • JA*<r?
£AA
PA

•

^J>

Stuexfrs/

A^JtuJzJ

• eL^U

au+s~*>LJ- £

£>{At~d4uA

£

*SAAJ*J
£

a w A

'/
M*~»fl/;
—55

<X~o*^J*J
£
*
*«-=*

Su>£klS€V

Mrf»Arf

#e.C0#AJ.lfr

Sac*^;{•/•£*

S^Jf^/

A ^ * * U ~ . J ~

GRAND TOTAL (per month) S

2 / V& . +»

, propose the above settlement.

(

/CUMJ*

/
If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately
««

• .*•

^t_ •

„..

/>- At^^<j^

,y^

ftfflj^f/Defendant
hours and

witnesses will

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct,
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
/(/Z?

1
Notary Public
JOANNES
NE k BROOKS I
215 South State #800 I
Salt Lake City.Utah 84111 !
My Commission Expires I
June 27. 1995
I
State of Utah

J

day of.

<£^

^*^L

^f

j=.

A* £2

^^^^y

otary Public residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

J27. ,/f ?S~

BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX
RETURNS. CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS. CHECKBOOKS. CANCELLED CHECKS.
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.
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PLAINTIFF'S EXBODBTT 10

Kathleen McConkie (3978)
Attorney for Plaintiff
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)537-1508
Telefax: (801)328-3629

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
]|
i

MAURIA T. SWENSEN,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiff,
V.

JAMES G. SWENSEN,Jr.

i

Case No. 924902803DA

Defendant.

i

Judge Dennis Frederick

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

SS

I, Kathleen McConkie, Esq., being first duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney of record in the above-entitled matter.

2.

I primarily practise in the area of Domestic Relations

and have done so for the last ten (10) years.
3.

I charge $130.00 an hour.

4.

It is my belief the fees and rate are reasonable in the

Affidavit Of Attorney Fees
Judge Dennis Frederick
Page 1

swensen.fee

community.
5.

I

have

spent

approximately

30

hours

in

travel,

consultation with client, court appearances, and the drafting of
pleadings in the above regard to trial.

The fees to date are

$4,990.40.
6.

I anticipate that I will bill 3 0 additional hours, which

will include the month of December, the trial and final orders,
etc.
7.

Supplemental

attorney's

fees

will,

therefore,

approximately total $10,000.00.
8.

Further affiant saith not.

DATED this/SW^.day of December, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,

Kathleen McConkie
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

1
1

NOTARY PUBUC

|

STEVEN E. WRIGHT

•

ffSEffii 2702 SO WOOD HOLLOW WAY
ttlKl
BOUNTIFUL, LTT 84010
My Commission Expires Apr 14,199?
State of Utah

Affidavit Of Attorney Fees
Judge Dennis Frederick
Page 2

1
•
|
-

j&

ay of December, 1993.

'#&</?- fcpfa&A't

•Notary Public

swensen.fee

CERTIFICATE OP DELIVERY

I c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e

day of December, 1993, I hand

d e l i v e r e d a copy of t h e foregoing document t o t h e f o l l o w i n g :
Kenneth A. Okazaki, Esq.
175 East 400 South, #900
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111

A f f i d a v i t Of Attorney Fees
Judge Dennis Frederick
Page 3

lawrence.118

Kathleen McConkie
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1200
3 6 South State
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Invoice submitted to:
Ms. Mauria Swensen
2615 East Lincoln Lane
Salt Lake City UT 84124

October 4, 1993
Invoice #10072
Hrs/Rate

Amount

Professional services
1.00
130.00/hr

130.00

2.50
130.00/hr

325.00

07/29/93 Discovery preparation.

2.00
130.00/hr

260.00

07/30/93 Telephone conference with client.
Correspondence to Kenneth Okazaki.

0.30
130.00/hr

39.00

08/11/93 Telephone call to opposing counsel,

0.50
130.00/hr

65.00

0.60
130.00/hr

78.00

1.60
130.00/hr

208.00

06/02/93 Consultation.
07/09/93 Research. Review file.
to opposing counse.

Phone call

Review file.
08/17/93 Review of file and documents,

Ms. Mauria Swensen

Page 2
Hrs/Rate

Amount

08/18/93 Call from Ken Okazaki.

0.30
130.00/hr

39..00

08/19/93 Conference with opposing party.

1.80
130.00/hr

234,.00

0.30
130.00/hr

39,.00

08/25/93 Call from opposing counsel,

0.30
130.00/hr

39,.00

08/30/93 Telephone conference with Kenneth
Okazaki.

1.30
130.00/hr

169..00

08/31/93 Meeting with Ken Okazaki.

2.00
130.00/hr

260..00

09/02/93 Conference with client.
Discovery.

1.50
130.00/hr

195.,00

2.00
130.00/hr

260.,00

1.50
130.00/hr

195.,00

0.30
130.00/hr

39..00

Pre-trial conference with client,

Review of

09/21/93 Meeting with opposing counsel.
Meeting with Wayne Mills.
09/27/93 Call from Kenneth Okazaki.

For professional services rendered

19.80

$2,574.00

Additional charges:
08/16/93 Three pages of faxes received from Ken
Okazaki § $0.25 per page.

0.75

Ms* Mauria Swensen

Page 3
Amount

08/18/93 Ten pages of fax sent to Kenneth Okazaki @
$1.30 per page.
08/27/93 Three pages of fax sent to Ken Okazaki @
$1.30 per page.

Total costs

Total amount of this bill
09/13/93 Payment - thank you
Balance due

13.00
3.90

$17.65

$2,591.65
($2,000.00)
$591.65

Kathleen McConkie
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1200
3 6 South State
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Invoice submitted to:
Ms, Mauria Swensen
2615 East Lincoln Lane
Salt Lake City UT 84124

November 5, 1993
Invoice #10081
Hrs/Rate

Amount

Professional services
10/07/93 Modify documents.
Okazaki.

Call to Ken

0.60
130.00/hr

78.00

0.60
130.00/hr

78.00

0.40
130.00/hr

52.00

0.30
130.00/hr

39.00

0.40
130.00/hr

52.00

10/15/93 Call to opposing counsel.
Discussion regarding practice.

0.60
130.00/hr

78.00

10/19/93 Research.

0.40
130.00/hr

52.00

10/11/93 Review of stipulation.

Re-draft.

Telephone call from Ken Okazaki.
10/12/93 Review second stipulation.
Redraft documents.

Ms. Mauria Swensen

Page 2

Hrs/Rate
10/28/93 Draft documents,

For professional services rendered

0.50
130.00/hr

3.80

Amount
65.00

$494.00

Additional charges:
10/31/93 Expert witness fees.

1,000.00

Total costs

$1,000.00

Total amount of this bill

$1,494.00

Previous balance

Balance due

$591.65

$2,085.65

Kathleen McConkie
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1200
3 6 South State
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Invoice submitted to:
Ms. Mauria Swensen
2615 East Lincoln Lane
Salt Lake City UT 84124

December 8, 1993
Invoice #10120
Hrs/Rate

Amount

Professional services
2.00
130.00/hr

260.00

11/09/93 Telephone call from Kenneth
Okazaki. Discussion regarding
settlement.

1.10
130.00/hr

143.00

11/23/93 Trial preparation.

0.60
130.00/hr

78.00

11/29/93 Trial preparation. Telephone call
to opposing counsel.

2.00
130.00/hr

260.00

11/04/93 Review of documents.

Discovery.

For professional services rendered

5.70

$741.00

Additional charges:
11/20/93 Invoice from Wayne Mills for detailed letter
regarding needed tax and accounting matters.

112.50

Ms. Mauria Swensen

Page 2
Amount

12/01/93 Two pages of fax to Okazaki @ $1.30 per
page.

2.60

12/03/93 Fourteen pages of fax to Wayne Mills, CPA @
$1.30 per page.

18.20

Two pages of fax to Kenneth Okazaki @ $1.3 0
per page.

2.60

12/06/93 Three pages of fax to Ken Okazaki @ $1.30
per page.
Pedal Express to Kenneth Okazaki1s and Wayne
Mill's offices.

3.90
23.95

Total costs

$163.75

Total amount of this bill

$904.75

Previous balance

$2,085.65

Balance due

$2,990.40
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A

I am.

Q

Would you tell the Court what you're doing?

A

I am studying at getting my master's degree at the

University of Utah.
Q

What are you getting your master's in?

A

In recreational therapy.

Q

Do you have an estimate of how long it will take

for you to complete this master's degree?
A

I should be finished in two more years from this

month.
Q

Have you worked —

when were you married to the

Defendant?
A

Pardon me?

Q

I'm sorry.

A

On November 22nd, 1974.

Q

During that time have you worked outside of the

A

Yes, I worked while Jim was in law school.

Q

And when was Jim in law school?

A

'79, he started in 1979.

Q

Did you work the entire time he was in law school?

A

Yes.

Q

What did you do?

A

I worked as a graduate assistant for a professor on

When were you married to the Defendant?

home?

campus and I did some secretarial work for him.

Mostly I was

23

able to bring the work home so that I could be home with my
children.
Q

Was this at BYU?

A

It was.

Q

And do you recall what you earned?

A

I'm not sure.

I think it's about $6 an hour as a

graduate student.
Q

Did you work full-time?

A

I did not.

Q

Do you have children, Ms. Swensen?

A

I do.

Q

How many children do you have?

A

I have four children.

Q

Could you tell the Court their names and ages,

please?
A

Allison is 18, Nathan is 17, Claire is 13, anc

Tanner is 9.
Q

Do you own property?

Do you own real property,

land or houses?
A

Yes.

Q

Can you tell the Court what you own?

A

I own jointly with Mr. Swensen a home in Orem and

the home that I'm presently living in.
Q

Were those pieces of property purchased during the

marriage?

24

1

Q

Do you owe your father $3,000?

2

A

I do.

3

Q

Are you going to have to pay him back?

4

A

Yes, I am.

5

Q

And when did he loan you the $3,000?

6

A

Pardon me?

7

Q

When did he loan you —

8

A

When?

9

Q

What purpose was that why he loaned you the money?

10

A

He loaned me the money, 2,000 of it, to pay attor-

In 1992 after July and in the fall.

11

ney's fees and a thousand to pay him back for a personal

12

loan.

13
14

Q

Did you pay that $3,000 to your —

the $2,000 to

your attorneys?

15

A

I did.

16

Q

How much did you pay prior to the time of your

17

coming to me?

18

A

Just under $5,000.

19

Q

Could you tell me how many attorneys you've had in

20

this case?

21

A

You're my third attorney.

22

Q

And would you like to explain to the Court why you

23

\
25 I

had needed three attorneys?
A

I've needed three attorneys because of all of the

complications of the case and they have not been able to have
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A

Yes.

Q

Is it true and correct to the best of your

knowledge?
A

It is.

Q

Has your lifestyle changed since you've been sepa-

rated from the Defendant?
A

It has.

Q

And these things, the differences in your

lifestyle?
A

Yes.

Q

I've noticed that you have put down here school

clothes and furniture from thrift store.
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Have you bought —

have you not been able to buy

clothes for the children at a regular department store?
A

I haven't.

Q

What about for yourself, have you been able to buy

any clothes for yourself?
A

I have purchased some for them but we have supple-

mented also.
Q

Have you taken any vacations?

A

I have.

Q

Where have you gone?

A

I went to Phoenix in the spring.

My mother lives

there.
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Q

Did you take the children with you?

A

I didn't.

Q

Let's go to Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.
Mrs. Swensen, do you presently have life insurance?

A

I don't.

Q

Are you in need of life insurance?

A

I am.

Q

Do you presently have health insurance?

A

Through Mr. Swensen's business.

Q

Have you checked with Mr. Swensen's insurance

carrier to see if there's a Cobra policy?
A

It is.

Q

Is there a Cobra policy?

A

I'm not able to continue with that policy.

Q

So as soon as you're divorced, will you be in need

of health insurance?
A

I will.

Q

Mrs. Swensen, are you presently in need of

counseling?
A

Yes.

Q

And have you been going to counseling?

A

I have.

Q

Have you at this point been paying for that?

A

I have not.

Q

Will that be able to continue?
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1

A

On several occasions he's stated no.

2

MR. OKAZAKI:

3

THE COURT:

4

Q

Object, hearsay.

It is.

(By Ms. McConkie)

Sustained.
Did your brothers and sisters

5

receive similar disbursements when your parents gave you a

6

disbursement?

7

A

Except for one brother.

8

Q

And what did he receive?

9

A

He had been cashing out of his portion because he

10

wanted his inheritance.

11

MR. OKAZAKI:

Objection.

12

THE COURT:

13

State the grounds of your objection.

14

MR. OKAZAKI:

15

THE COURT:

Just a moment, ma'am.

It's speculation, hearsay,

There's no foundation.

I'm going to

16

sustain the objection, but moreover, what relevance is it

17

what her siblings got out of it?

18

MS. McCONKIE:

Your Honor, we're just trying to put

19

evidence to show that it was a preinheritance gift and that

20

all of the children

21
22
23

THE COURT:
so

—
She has said that they all got money

~
Q

(By Ms. McConkie)

Have you had control over any of

24

the IRA's or any of the other marital assets during the

25

separation?
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A

I have not.

Q

So is it your testimony that you have made no

deposits?
A

None.

Q

No withdrawals?

A

None.

Q

Do you have information that would suggest that

monies have been removed from those IRA accounts?
A

Yes.

Q

How do you have that information?

A

Bank statements.

Q

From the IRA's?

A

Yes.

Q

Where did you receive those statements?

A

From Mr. Swensen.

Q

And when did you receive those?

A

When did I?

Q

Let me hand you a document —

After the separation.
may I approach, your

Honor?
THE COURT:
Q

You may.

(By Ms. McConkie)

Let me hand you a document.

Would you tell the Court what that is?
A

These are statements from USAA Money Market.

Q

Can you tell the Court on the first page
THE COURT:

—

Is this an exhibit, Counsel?
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MS. McCONKIE:

No, this is not an exhibit, your

Honor, it's just testimony.
Q

(By Ms. McConkie)

The amount, the date on that

document?
A

The date on the document is October 5th, 1992.

Q

And does the document have dates of certain

withdrawals?
A

It does.

Q

Can you tell the Court the date of the first with-

drawal on that document?
A

8-4-92.

Q

Was that a month after you had filed for divorce?

A

It was.

Q

And how much was taken out of that?

A

$1200.

Q

Would you go just quickly, read the list of amounts

that were taken out of that IRA accounts?
A

On the same day 3,000, 1700, another 1700, 2,000,

1200, 800, a thousand, 1500 on the one page.
MR. OKAZAKI:
the Court.

Your Honor, perhaps it would assist

These documents are found under tab 5 of our

exhibits.
Q

(By Ms. McConkie)
MR. OKAZAKI:

Would you go to the second page?

If the Court will, several pages down

it says USAA Money Market.

I don't believe it's an IRA

53

they're talking about.
tab 5.

These are the last three pages under

That might help, your Honor.

Q

(By Ms. McConkie)

The third page, what is that

A

The page is a xerox copy of checks that

page?

Mr. Swensen's written to himself out of this mutual fund.
Q

Do you recognize Mr. Swensen's signature?

A

I do.

Q

Can you tell the Court the amounts of those checks?

A

Twelve hundred, eight hundred, and a thousand.

Q

And if you go to the next page, what is that?
MR. OKAZAKI:

Your Honor, we'll stipulate to all

these withdrawals that are contained
THE COURT:

—

They do appear to be, at least the ones

that she's now referred to on the —
MR. OKAZAKI:

We'll stipulate they're in our

exhibit and we're going to testify about those withdrawals,
so if Counsel wants to go through this, she can, but we're
agreeing that those withdrawals were made and they're contained in our exhibit.
Q

(By Ms. McConkie)

Mrs. Swensen.

Let me ask you this,

Did you personally make any of those

withdrawals?
A

I didn't.

Q

Did the Defendant ever ask you or have your
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TabG

Q

So this is a list that just includes the property

was left at the home; is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

The marital home?

A

Some of the property left at the home.

Q

Isn't it true that you took the queen-sized bed?

A

That's correct,

Q

And the double bed?

A

That was the children's.

Q

And the Eames chair?

A

That was a gift on the graduation from law school.

Q

Could you please be responsive?
A table?

A

Yes.

Q

A lamp?

A

Yes.

Q

Chairs?

A

Four folding chairs.

Q

Power tools?

A

Yes.

Q

Sports equipment?

A

Yes.

Q

And some utensils?

A

Yes.

Q

And camping equipment?

Just yes or no.

1

A

That's correct.

2

Q

And that you have taken funds out of that account

3

which you have not paid back; isn't that true?

4

A

That's correct.

5

Q

Do you recall taking out $3500 from that account?

6

A

Thirty-five hundred?

7

Q

Thirty-five hundred.

8

A

No.

9

Q

Let me see if I can refresh your recollection on

10

that.

11

While I'm looking for that document, do you recall

12

paying any marital or any accounts from your Guardian State

13

Bank account?

14

A

Paying any accounts?

15

Q

Do you recall paying any bills from your Guardian

16

State —

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

That are not related to the Crest View home?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

And can you tell the Court what they are?

21

A

I've paid legal fees from that account.

22

Q

Now, those accounts were marital funds; isn't that

23

true?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And you paid your legal fees from that account?
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Q

Okay.

A

$430, half of that's 215.

Q

Oh, okay.

A

Fifth line, yes.

Q

I see it.

I see.

Okay.

Now, you actually took that $430, did you not, and
paid that from marital funds?
A

I don't recall what the source of that amount was.

There were some amended returns relating to the schedule on
page 19 which I used funds from the Guardian account for.
Q

And in terms of those marital funds and in terms of

this balance sheet, were you requesting that Mrs. Swensen
repay you monies that you paid a marital debt from marital
funds; is that what you are asking?
A

Yes.

Q

And did you repay those funds to the Guardian

account?
A

No.

Q

But you're asking Mrs. Swensen repay those funds to

the Guardian account?
A

Well, it depends on who gets the Guardian account.

If I get the Guardian account, then it's in one pocket and
out the other.

If Mrs. Swensen gets the Guardian account,

then it's the same thing.
Q

If in fact it was a marital debt and it was paid by
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1

recently as August, I believe, I borrowed $3,000 to carry

2

over my law practice.

3

Q

That was repaid.

I'm going to hand you just a copy of a check that

4

you've already testified to. On your first check, is this

5

the check that —

6

student loan?

the $10,996.46 that you paid for your

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

And the next check down, 7,250, can you explain why

9

you took money from the Dreyfus account and put it into the

10

mutual fund?

11

A

12

Consolidated —
MR. OKAZAKI: Your Honor, I'm confused.

I haven't

13

seen any of these things and I don't know if we're on the

14

Dreyfus account or we're on the Guardian account or which

15

account we're on.

16

Guardian account.

17
18

Q

I thought you were asking about the

(By Ms. McConkie)

your signature?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

And did you —

21

Did you write these; is that

and you've testified that you paid

the student loan; isn't that true?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Did you use marital funds to do that?

24

A

Sure.

25

Q

Would you be willing to pay that back so that the
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fund

—
A

No.

Q

—

A

No.

Q

On your balance sheet which we talked about previ-

so that the fund wouldn't be deleted?

ously, which is page 1, do you recall doing a balance sheet
in October of 1992?
A

I've done a variety of these balance sheets for

different negotiations with Plaintiff.
Q

Do you know if the figures in the IRA's have

increased or decreased?
A

They have

—

MR. OKAZAKI:
Q

Time frame, Counsel.

(By Ms. McConkie)

From the time of October 19th,

1992, to December 1993.
A

Probably —

well, I don't know.

They had earnings

and I've taken distributions.
Q

Would you be surprised to know that from the two

balance sheets that you have provided there has been a
decrease of $13,779?
MR. OKAZAKI:

Counsel, perhaps you could show him

the document you're talking about.
MS. McCONKIE:

Just asking him, would you be

surprised?
THE WITNESS:

No, I would be surprised it would be
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